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Abstract
CAEPR Working Paper 108/2016 described the number and pattern of 
social security penalties being applied to jobseekers participating in the 
Remote Jobs and Communities Program. The paper argued that more 
onerous requirements of jobseekers in the remote areas covered by that 
scheme was a major driver of their being overrepresented among those 
being penalised across the social security system. From 1 July 2015, under 
what was renamed the Community Development Programme, even more 
stringent requirements were applied – in particular, the requirement that 
18–49-year-olds participate in Work for the Dole for 25 hours per week, 
five days per week, year-round. The paper predicted that this would lead to 
further increases in penalties. This paper analyses the first release of data 
about penalties applied under the new arrangements, covering the period 
from 1 July 2015 to 31 December 2015. It shows that penalties have, 
indeed, increased at a startling rate, and provides further evidence of the 
disproportionate impact of this change on Indigenous people.
Keywords: income support, employment, participation requirements, 
compliance, Community Development Programme
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Introduction
I n a recent CAEPR Working Paper, Financial penalties under the Remote Jobs and Communities 
Program (Fowkes & Sanders 2016), Dr Will Sanders 
and I described the increasing number and rate of 
social security penalties being applied to jobseekers 
participating in the Remote Jobs and Communities 
Program (RJCP).1 In that article, we noted that from 
1 July 2015 changes to RJCP (which included renaming 
to the Community Development Programme or CDP) 
had substantially increased obligations for program 
participants, with most required to Work for the Dole for 
25 hours over five days in each week throughout the year. 
Our argument was that these more onerous requirements 
were likely to further accelerate the rate of penalties being 
applied and exacerbate the disproportionate burden of 
social security penalties falling on remote (predominantly 
Indigenous) Australians.
This paper presents analysis of the first release of social 
security penalties data, following the implementation 
of the new Work for the Dole arrangements under what 
is now called CDP. As expected, it shows a dramatic 
increase in the number of penalties applied to jobseekers 
in CDP. Although CDP participants make up only around 
5% of the total number of jobseekers to whom the 
relevant social security penalties apply, these data show 
that in the first six months of the CDP they incurred more 
penalties than the other 95% of jobseekers combined. 
CDP penalties have also contributed to a substantial 
rise in the proportion of penalties being applied to 
Indigenous people.
Background
On 1 July 2013, a new remote employment program – 
RJCP – was established by the then Labor government, 
replacing existing ‘mainstream’ employment programs 
(Job Services Australia and Disability Employment 
Services) and the Community Development Employment 
Projects program (CDEP), which was specifically for 
remote areas. RJCP had around 37 000 participants, 
of whom around 85% were identified as Indigenous. 
Under the program, most participants were required 
to participate in some form of ‘activity’ for between 15 
and 20 hours per week, although there was flexibility 
for participants to be referred to alternative forms of 
assistance such as health or counselling programs, 
training or voluntary activities. The election of the 
Coalition government in September 2013 brought an 
increased emphasis on ‘structured activities’, which 
involved more rigid structuring of daily activity schedules, 
tighter supervision and keeping of timesheets. In 
December 2014, the Minister for Indigenous Affairs 
announced radical changes to the program to take 
effect from 1 July 2015. Under the changes (which 
were accompanied by a name change to CDP), most 
unemployed people aged from 18 to 49 were required to 
Work for the Dole for 25 hours per week, five days per 
week throughout the year, with up to six weeks time off in 
each year (Scullion 2014).
As discussed in our April 2016 Working Paper, the 
obligations of most income support recipients under 
RJCP were already more onerous than those of their 
counterparts in Job Services Australia (Fowkes & 
Sanders 2016).2 This, we argued, had contributed to the 
application of a higher rate of financial penalties under 
RJCP than under the ‘mainstream’ Job Services Australia 
program. Inadequacy of protections for the vulnerable 
and a level of resistance to requirements perceived as 
unfair or purposeless also, in our view, contributed to the 
heavier burden of penalties being applied. On this basis, 
we anticipated that the number and rate of penalties 
would continue to climb, and even accelerate, once the 
new Work for the Dole rules were implemented.
Numbers of penalties applied under 
the first six months of the Community 
Development Programme
On 1 June 2016, the Australian Government Department 
of Employment released data on social security penalties 
for the last two quarters of 2015 – the first six months 
of the new CDP Work for the Dole arrangements 
(DoE, various dates).
In the last two quarters of 2015, 50 807 financial penalties 
were applied to jobseekers in CDP (Fig. 1). This was more 
than double the number of penalties applied to this group 
in the first six months of 2015 (19 295), before the new 
rules came into effect.
Of the 50 807 penalties applied in the first six months 
of CDP, 44 488 (88%) were No Show, No Pay penalties, 
which are applied when a participant fails to attend 
their Work for the Dole activity and does not provide 
a ‘valid excuse’.3 Each penalty means a loss of 1/10th 
of an individual’s fortnightly benefit, with each day of 
nonattendance able to be counted as a separate ‘breach’, 
attracting its own penalty. No Show, No Pay penalties 
tripled from 14 835 in the first half of 2015 to 44 488 in the 
six months after the new rules were in place (Fig. 2).
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FIG. 1.  Financial penalties under RJCP and CDP, by quarter, July 2013 to December 2015
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FIG. 2 .  No Show, No Pay penalties for nonattendance at activities under RJCP and CDP, by quarter, 
July 2013 – December 2015
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Not all of this change can be attributed to the changed 
obligations of jobseekers. The changes to the program 
funding deed and guidelines that brought about new 
Work for the Dole requirements also linked the bulk of 
providers’ service fees to attendance in the Work for the 
Dole program (DPM&C 2015). Where a participant fails to 
attend their Work for the Dole activity without providing a 
valid excuse, the provider is not paid the relevant service 
fee for that time unless they report the noncompliance 
and re-engage the participant within two weeks. Although 
providers have discretion not to recommend a penalty 
in cases where they feel that it is not appropriate, they 
are penalised financially for making this decision and it 
reflects poorly in their performance rating.4
The highest level of penalties applied to those who fail 
to meet their participation obligations relates to ‘serious 
failures’. Serious failures may occur where a jobseeker 
has refused or rejected suitable work (including losing 
work through misconduct) – called here ‘employment-
related’ failures. Serious failures also occur in cases of 
what is called ‘persistent noncompliance’. Persistent 
noncompliance requires that a jobseeker incur three 
minor penalties (e.g. No Show, No Pay penalties) over a 
six-month period, and that the Australian Government 
Department of Human Services determine that this has 
occurred ‘intentionally, recklessly or negligently’. Serious 
penalties attract up to eight weeks without income 
support, although this can be waived when a jobseeker 
agrees to return to Work for the Dole.5
In the two quarters following the start of CDP, 
5794 serious failures were applied for persistent 
noncompliance, more than twice the number (2006) in 
the previous six months (Fig. 3). Because three penalties 
must be applied for the serious failure to occur, there 
is a lag between new requirements and their leading to 
serious failures – one reason for the close to tripling of 
penalties between the quarter ending September 2015 
(1646) and the quarter ending December 2015 (4148).
The relative burden of penalties 
falling on CDP participants
Figures presented in the Forrest review suggest that 
CDP participants make up around 5% of the total 
group of unemployed people engaged in major labour 
market programs (Forrest 2014). In our earlier Working 
Paper (Fowkes & Sanders 2016), Sanders and I showed 
that the percentage of financial penalties imposed on 
CDP participants was substantially higher than their 
5% representation in the overall jobseeker group. We 
argued that a major contributor to that difference was the 
more onerous annual activity requirements under RJCP 
compared with Job Services Australia – the program 
that accounts for around 83% of jobseekers nationally. 
In July 2015, as the new CDP Work for the Dole rules 
came into effect, Jobs Services Australia was replaced 
by the new jobactive program. Although jobactive has a 
greater emphasis on Work for the Dole than Job Services 
FIG. 3 .  RJCP and CDP serious failures (persistent noncompliance), by quarter, July 2013 – December 2015
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Australia, it has left the hours of activity requirements 
broadly unchanged.6 The change in requirements was 
most substantial in CDP.
The activity requirements under jobactive and CDP 
are summarised in Table 1. Over most age groups and 
jobseeker categories, activity requirements under CDP 
are substantially higher than under jobactive.
In the quarter ending December 2015, more than half of 
all financial penalties nationally (57%) were applied to 
CDP participants (Fig. 4). This rose to 62% of No Show, 
No Pay (activity-related) penalties and 78% of persistent 
noncompliance failures. Some caution is needed in 
considering these figures. During this period, there was 
a major transition from Job Services Australia to the new 
jobactive program, which started on 1 July 2015. It is 
likely that this caused a temporary reduction in penalties 
being applied to nonremote jobseekers, inflating CDP 
penalties as a proportion of the whole. However, the 
number of No Show, No Pay penalties applied to CDP 
jobseekers in the last quarter of 2015 exceeded the 
FIG. 4 .  Financial penalties applied to jobseekers in RJCP and CDP as a percentage of all penalties 
applied nationally, by quarter, July 2013 – December 2015
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number applied to Job Services Australia participants in 
any quarter over the two years leading up to the change 
to jobactive. If current policy settings continue, there is no 
question that the 5% of participants who are in CDP will 
continue to be penalised at a much higher rate than their 
counterparts in nonremote areas.
The enormous acceleration in CDP penalties has also 
contributed to something that we have not seen before 
in this data series. Across the social security system, 
around 11% of jobseekers are identified as Indigenous, 
but, in the last six months of 2015, 62% of all financial 
penalties were applied to this group. It is clear from the 
types of penalties being applied that this does not reflect 
rejection by Indigenous jobseekers of work opportunities.
Since the final quarter of 2010, the incidence of 
employment-related penalties (those that relate to 
rejection or failure to pursue work opportunity) among 
Indigenous-identified jobseekers has been steady and 
proportionate to the Indigenous share of jobseekers, 
at around 11% (Fig. 5). However, Indigenous-identified 
caepr.anu.edu.au
FIG. 5 .  Percentage of serious penalties applied to all Indigenous-identified jobseekers, by quarter, 
October 2010 – December 2015
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TABLE 1. Activity requirements under CDP and jobactive
Category jobactive (July 2015 – June 2020) CDP (July 2015 – June 2018)
Point at which annual activity 
requirement (Work for the Dole) starts
Annual activity requirement starts 
after 12 months or more receiving 
assistance. Work for the Dole is 
default, but jobseeker can opt 
for accredited training, voluntary 
work, part-time work or another 
approved program
Work for the Dole activity requirement 
starts immediately and is mandatory 
for 18–49-year-olds with full-time work 
capacity, unless in part-time work
Hours of activity required (other than 
early school leavers under 22 years 
of age) – people with full-time work 
capacity
Aged under 30: 650 hours over 
26 weeks each year (50 hours per 
fortnight)
Aged 30–59: 390 hours over 26 weeks 
each year (30 hours per fortnight)
Aged 18–49: 25 hours per week in 
Work for the Dole activities with up to 
6 weeks time off, with approval, each 
year (1150 hours each year)
Early school leavers who are under 
22 years of age
25 hours per week (less for principal 
carers and people with part-time work 
capacity)
25 hours per week (less for principal 
carers and people with part-time work 
capacity)
People with part-time work capacity 
and principal carers
Aged under 30: 390 hours over 
26 weeks each year (30 hours 
per fortnight)
Aged 30–59: 200 hours over 26 weeks 
(15–16 hours per fortnight)
30 hours per fortnight or up to work 
capacity. Approximately 600 hours 
each year, noting that principal carers 
may not be required to participate 
during school holidays
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jobseekers have received persistent noncompliance 
failures far more often than their non–Indigenous 
identified counterparts throughout the period. This rate 
has been on the rise, not just since the most recent 
CDP changes, but for some time before. Indigenous 
jobseekers appear no less willing to work, but they are 
falling foul of system rules at a very high and accelerating 
rate. CDP marked an acceleration of a trend that was 
already apparent. This raises broader questions for 
policy makers about the appropriateness of existing 
employment services to Indigenous people.
Conclusion
From 1 July 2013 to the end of December 2015, there 
were 6436 instances of people in RJCP or CDP being 
assisted to achieve employment lasting 13 weeks or 
more.7 In our previous paper, Sanders and I argued that, 
on the basis of data then available, RJCP participants 
were more likely to incur a serious failure than be assisted 
into 13 weeks of employment. From these latest data, we 
can see that, from 1 July 2013 to the end of 2015, almost 
twice as many serious penalties were applied (12 624) as 
13-week employment outcomes were secured. The rise of 
financial penalties – particularly penalties associated with 
Work for the Dole – has been exponential. Reports are 
beginning to emerge of the impact of lost income support 
on families and communities (Curtin 2016, Wild 2016ab). 
The punitive aspects of CDP appear to be putting at risk 
not only economic outcomes, but wider social and health 
outcomes. Indigenous communities have long supported 
programs that provide work at fair wages, and that offer 
opportunity to pursue economic aspirations. But this 
punitive, externally imposed model offers neither fairness 
nor opportunity. It must be replaced.
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Notes
1. The term ‘jobseekers’ here refers to those categories 
of income support recipients who have participation 
requirements under social security legislation. At present, 
these are recipients of Newstart and Youth Allowance 
(Other), principal carers with school age children, some 
Disability Support Pension recipients under 35 and some 
Special Benefit recipients.
2. While penalties are established nationally under social 
security legislation, particular obligations applying 
within each program are set out in funding deeds and 
guidelines. These are then incorporated into individual 
agreements with jobseekers. For more detail about how 
obligations are set, please refer to our earlier Working Paper 
(Fowkes & Sanders 2016).
3. The provider must record the nonattendance, noting whether 
a valid excuse has been given. If no valid excuse has been 
given, they may either report the invalid nonattendance or 
exercise discretion to allow the absence. Where an invalid 
absence has been reported by the provider, the Department 
of Human Services checks that the criteria for imposition 
of a penalty are met (e.g. the individual had a Job Plan that 
clearly spelled out the requirement) and imposes the penalty 
if they are satisfied that the criteria are met.
4. The significant jump between the September 2015 quarter 
and the December 2015 quarter reflects the transition period 
to the new model. In the first instance, for a penalty to be 
applied to an individual, each individual must have entered 
into a Job Plan reflecting the new arrangements – a process 
that takes some time. In addition, up until 31 December 
2015, providers were guaranteed payment based on a 
minimum 75% attendance to give them time to establish 
projects and practices to support the new arrangements. 
Unless something changes, the December 2015 quarter is 
more likely to reflect the ongoing rate of penalties.
5. The jobseeker must agree to participate in a ‘compliance 
activity’ – essentially, daily Work for the Dole. For 
participants in CDP (unlike those in jobactive), this is 
equivalent to the requirements that are already in place 
(i.e. 25 hours per week), and take-up appears high. In 
practice, it is hard to tell how much income is lost through 
persistent noncompliance penalties as opposed to the ‘short 
penalties’ (such as No Show, No Pay) that must be incurred 
in the lead-up to them.
6. Although it was initially announced that some jobactive 
participants could be required to participate in Work for the 
Dole after six months, in the 2016 Budget the Australian 
Government reversed this decision so that the obligation 
does not arise until after 12 months of assistance.
7. Figures presented by the Australian Government 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet to the 
Senate Finance and Public Administration Committee 
on 26 February 2016 in response to questions asked 
during the Inquiry into the Social Security Legislation 
Amendment (Community Development Program) Bill 2015, 
available at www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/
Committees/Senate/Finance_and_Public_Administration/
Social_Security/Additional_Documents.
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